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INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1978, the economy of the People's Republic of China
(China) could be characterized as a typical command economy in which
"[p]lanning was accomplished by the government, what to produce was
determined by the government, manufactured products were allocated by
the government, prices were set by the government, profits were remit-
ted to the government and losses were subsidized by the government."'
Because this system "became an obstacle hindering further economic
development,"2 China commenced an economic reform program in
1978' to decentralize the system. In particular, much of the reform in
the past seventeen years has focused on solving the efficiency and
related problems of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
SOEs generally have three features: (1) the state owns the assets; (2)
the enterprises engage in the production of goods and services for sale;
and (3) the enterprises' sales revenues bear some relationship to cost.
5
As will be seen in more detail infra Part I, the SOEs' problems stem
from the tension between the first two features (state ownership and the
enterprises' production function). On the one hand, although state own-
ership of assets need not mean state control,6 such control is a likely
consequence of ownership and is in fact the chief characteristic of
Chinese SOEs.7 On the other hand, SOEs must use those state-owned
1. Dai Yannian, Spotlight on China's Modern Enterprise System, BEIJING REV., Feb.
28-Mar. 6, 1994, at 4. However, China's economy was never completely planned. The
number of commodities planned and distributed from the center usually did not exceed
several hundred, in contrast to the 60,000 such commodities in the U.S.S.R. Instead, much of
the planning occurred at the local level, uncoordinated by the central government; much
investment occurred outside of the plan; and, of course, a lot of planning took place only on
paper. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It?, 10 PAc. BASIN L.J. 1, 5-6 (1991).
2. Dal, supra note 1, at 4.
3. The reform period dates from the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1978, when China's leadership announced its intention
to focus on economic development. For commonly cited discussions of the initial reform
period, see HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER MAO (1987);
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA (Elizabeth Perry and Christine
Wong eds., 1985).
4. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 1, at 7; Wallace W.Y. Wang, Reforming State Enterprises
in China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 89, 91-92 (1992). The SOEs' problems will be described in more
detail infra part I.A.
5. YAIR AHARONI, THE EVOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES
6 (1986).
6. lId at 7.
7. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 1, at 7 ("Generally, a state-owned enterprise is one that is
controlled by one or more units of government at or above the county level."); Wang, supra
note 4, at 91 n.5 ("In the Chinese context of state-owned enterprise, the state... controls the
enterprise .... "); Gary H. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski, How Industrial Reform Worked
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assets in order to be productive.8 It is these competing claims to state
property that define the state-enterprise property relationship and that lie
at the heart of the SOEs' problems. This Note will examine the latest
attempt to reform this state-enterprise property relationship 9 - the
"modem enterprise system."
The modem enterprise system is characterized by the incorporation
of SOEs with the state as the sole or majority shareholder and as the
owner of the state-owned assets.10 This process is known as
"corporatization" 1' and is now governed by the Company Law of the
People's Republic of China (Company Law). 2 Because many SOEs
have already incorporated, 3 and because the formation of the modem
in China: The Role of Innovation, Competition and Property Rights 5 (1994) (unpublished
paper, on file with author) (" '[T]he central fact' is that 'government and party officials'
exercise 'all rights to control .... ").
8. Wang, supra note 4, at 102.
9. The reform of SOEs can be divided into two broad categories. The reform of the
state-enterprise property relationship falls most neatly into the category of internal reforms.
These reforms seek to restructure SOEs to change the way that SOEs respond to their
environment. Clarke, supra note 1, at 8. External reforms aim to change the environment in
which SOEs operate. Id. As an example of external reforms, Clarke emphasizes the reform of
the pricing mechanism, crucial to determining whether an enterprise is actually making a
profit. Id. at 12. Baev further divides these external reforms into "demonopolization" ("the
liquidation of privileges and peculiar advantages vested in one or more state enterprises") and
"deintegration" ("the management reform of the national economy by means of reorganizing
Ministries and Government Departments, and abolishing systems of control over the distribu-
tion and consumption of commodities"). Andrei Baev, Alternatives to Privatization: Civil Law
and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Socialist Economies, 12 PAC. BASIN L.J.
131, 137 (1993).
10. The modern enterprise system will be described in detail infra part III.A.
11. See Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law
of the People's Republic of China, YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1995); Andrew X.F. Qian,
Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory
Regime in China, 12 PAC. BASIN L.J. 62 (1993). Some authors label the process "limited
privatization." See Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in
China, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L.R. 301 (1993). Since this Note stresses the differences between
privatization and the process undergone by China's SOEs, this Note will use the term
"corporatization."
12. Company Law of the People's Republic of China, reprinted and translated in [2 Bus.
Reg.] China L. for Foreign Bus. (CCH) 13-518 (Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Company Law].
Prior to July 1, 1994, the process was largely governed by the Opinion on Standards for
Companies Limited by Shares, reprinted and translated in [3 Bus. Reg.] China L. for Foreign
Bus. 16-625 (May 15, 1992), the Shenzhen Municipality Provisional Regulations on
Companies Limited by Shares, translated in SHENZHEN DAILY, Mar. 18, 1992, at 5, and the
Shanghai Municipality Provisional Regulations on Companies Limited by Shares, translated
in CHINA L. AND PRAC., Aug. 27, 1992, at 21. Bersani, supra note 11, at 308. These laws
have now been superseded by the Company Law. Art & Gu, supra note 11. For a detailed
discussion of the provisions of the Company Law, see David Ho, China's New Company
Law: Something Concrete to Go By, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 15, 1994, at 9; Art &
Gu, supra note 11.
13. Bersani states that "thousands" of SOEs have issued shares. Bersani, supra note 11,
at 307.
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enterprise system is now the centerpiece of China's efforts to restructure
the state-enterprise property relationship, 4 an examination of the role of
corporatization in reforming SOEs is warranted in order to determine
whether further evolution of the SOEs is necessary.
Accordingly, Part I of this Note first describes the problems that
have prodded China to restructure its SOEs and then explains the root of
those problems - the state-enterprise property relationship. This part
concludes with a description of the unsuccessful attempts to date to
reform that relationship.
To understand why these efforts have met with little success, Part II
explores the way in which most transition economies have attempted to
address the ambiguity in the state-enterprise property relationship, by
abolishing it through privatization. Although privatization is neither
economically nor ideologically suited to China, experience with privat-
ization does hold one lesson for China's restructuring effort: real reform
of the state-enterprise property relationship requires not only a change in
the legal definition of that relationship but also a cultural transformation
of the underlying expectations regarding ownership rights.
Part III examines whether corporatization facilitates that cultural
transformation. The Note concludes that corporatization attacks the
immediate problems of the SOEs, and on paper helps delineate the
respective property rights of the state and the SOEs, but in the end
effects little shift in the culture of state intervention underlying the
state-enterprise property relationship.
I. RESTRUCTURING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
A. Impetus for Reform: The Problems of SOEs
SOEs are the backbone of China's political, economic, and social
life. On the political front, "state ownership of the means of production
is a goal in itself" 5 for a socialist political order. Indeed, even after
amendments in 1988 and 1993,16 the PRC Constitution still requires that
major productive activities be carried out, at least in part, by the state.
17
14. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
15. AHARONI, supra note 5, at 45.
16. The PRC Constitution was amended in 1988 to recognize and protect private
enterprise. Alison W. Conner, To Get Rich Is Precarious: Regulation of Private Enterprise in
the PRC, 5 J. CHINESE L. 1, 17 (1991). The Constitution was amended again in 1993 to
revise terminology to be more in line with the goal of pursuing the socialist market economy,
for example, by changing "state-run enterprises" to "state-owned enterprises." NATALIE
LICHTENSTEIN, ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: THE EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 5 (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS 1198, Sept. 1993).
17. See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] (1982) art. 6, reprinted and translated in [I Bus. Reg.]
China L. for Foreign Bus. (CCH) 4-500 [hereinafter PRC CONSTITUTION] ("The basis of the
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Economically, SOEs account for forty percent of all industrial
output in China 18 and most of the employment. 19 SOEs have also taken
on the bulk of social welfare responsibilities, providing not only em-
ployment but also schools, housing, and health care for their employees
and their families. 20
Due to the importance of SOEs, their problems will have reper-
cussions well beyond the SOEs themselves. The chief problem which
SOEs face today is their poor economic performance. Even the Chinese
government no longer contests that the SOEs are inefficient.2' As will be
shown below, this inefficiency in turn poses a threat to China's econom-
ic health, social stability, and political foundation. It is this cumulation
of problems that has forced the government to reform the SOEs.
1. Threat to the Health of the Economy
One factor in the government's decision to reform the SOEs is the
threat that their inefficiency poses to the rest of the economy. This
threat can be direct (failing to supply goods to other firms) or indirect
(straining the available sources of finance).
socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of
the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by
the working people."); id. art. 7 ("The State-owned economy ... is the leading force in the
national economy."); id. art. 11 (providing that the private sector "is a complement to the
socialist public economy"); see also James V. Feinerman, The Evolving Chinese Enterprise,
15 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 203, 204 (1989) (discussing arts. 6 and 7 of the PRC Constitu-
tion).
For a discussion of the difference between SOEs and collectives, see infra part I.B.4.
18. Mark O'Neill, Once Dominant China State Sector Shrinks Further, Reuter Money
Rep., Jan. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File.
19. By 1993, SOEs employed 110 million workers, approximately the size of the entire
U.S. workforce. Cycle of Debt at Heart of Problem, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 26,
1994, at 24.
20. A total of 340 million people (workers and dependents) depend on SOEs for their
livelihood. Id; see also Wang, supra note 4, at 129.
21. "Efficiency" has two components. Static efficiency involves the measurement of
output per unit of inputs; the goal is to operate on the production frontier. Dynamic efficiency
measures the rate of change of output per unit of inputs; the goal is new investment and
innovation. AHARONI, supra note 5, at 172; Baev, supra note 9, at 139-40.
The SOEs' inefficiency on both counts is borne out by recent statistics. Despite achiev-
ing an average annual growth rate of 7.8% from 1980 to 1992, Jefferson & Rawski, supra
note 7, at 4, Table I, 44.5% of 100,000 audited SOEs lost money in the first nine months of
1994, representing total losses of 29.22 billion yuan, Xiao Yu, Backing for State Firms, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 1994, at 8. Further, one-third of SOE employees are redun-
dant. Foo Choy Peng, State Sector Holds Key to Future, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 7,
1994, at 1. In short, a survey by China's State Economic Commission found that SOEs
showed few signs of vitality. Wang, supra note 4, at 101 n.59.
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a. The SOE as Supplier
The first effect that SOE inefficiency has on the economy is direct.
The state sector is dominant in such basic areas as power generation,
metals, chemicals, machinery, and textiles,
22 so many nonstate firms23
depend on SOEs for supplies.24 If those SOEs cannot perform, the
productivity of many other firms will decrease.
b. Strain on Sources of Finance
A more indirect threat to the economy involves the SOEs' appetite
for capital. The SOEs' inefficiency causes them to absorb many of the
available sources of capital in China, harming both the institutions that
supply, and the other enterprises vying to obtain, that capital.
Until 1979, SOEs were financed solely through national budget
allocations. SOE inefficiency, however, has led to "voracious calls" on
the treasury, with subsidies amounting to three percent of gross domestic
product26 and sixty percent of the budget deficit in 1993.27
In an early attempt to alleviate the stress on the treasury, the gov-
ernment began requiring SOEs to borrow their capital from banks.28
Today, banks supply eighty percent of the working capital for SOEs.29
Such financing is a poor source of working capital for SOEs, however,
because the lending banks are typically "state banks" that can refuse to
22. In revenue terms, the state sector accounts for 92% of power generation, 86% of
ferrous metals, 72% of chemicals, 64% of machinery, and 53% of textiles. Lincoln Kaye, Fire
When Ready, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 23, 1995, at 50, 51.
23. China's economy has at least three sectors: the state sector, the collective sector, and
the private sector. The latter two sectors are commonly labeled the "nonstate sector." Conner,
supra note 16, at 2 n.4; see also LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 8-11 (labeling the collec-
tive and private sectors as "nonstate"). The private sector in China further includes individual
household enterprises, employing seven or fewer people, and private enterprises, employing
eight or more persons. Conner, supra note 16, at 2-3.
24. Geng Yuxin, Reform of State Enterprises to Enter New Stage, BEIJING REV., Nov.
21-27, 1994, at 4; see also Ira W. Lieberman, Privatization: The Theme of the 1990s, 28
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 8, 10 (1993) (arguing that private sector firms in many countries
depend on SOEs for support).
25. Jia Zhao & Li Qian, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regulation, Issues and
Prospects, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15, 1992, at 7.
26. Foo Choy Peng, supra note 21, at 1. The government is currently reporting that
restructuring has slashed subsidies by 50% in two years, from 100 billion yuan in 1992 to 50
billion yuan in 1994. 0' Neill, State Sector Shrinks, supra note 18.
27. Kaye, supra note 22, at 50.
28. Zhao & Li, supra note 25, at 7.
29. Rowena Tsang, Bad Debts Expected to Hit One Trillion Yuan, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1.
[Vol. 16:911
Spring 19951 Reforming the State-Enterprise Property Relationship 917
fund projects or can impose stricter terms on projects that involve
products that either are not in the plan or are deemed to be oversup-
plied, exposing SOEs to control by the state.30 Such lending is also a
problem for banks because an estimated one-third, or one trillion yuan,
of loans to SOEs by banks are nonperforming.3'
Another idea for financing the SOEs came in 1984 when SOEs were
allowed to lend funds to other SOEs. Unfortunately, these loans often
failed to earn expected profits. 32 The poor bank lending practices de-
scribed above coupled with the practice of interenterprise lending creat-
ed "triangular debt," where one money-losing SOE is unable to pay off
its debt to a bank or a second SOE because it is in turn owed money by
a third SOE.33 Currently, the triangular debt among state enterprises may
be as high as six hundred billion yuan.34
Enterprises also.gained the right in the early 1980s to issue non-
negotiable debentures to employees. 35 For enterprises with poor profit
records, however, such bonds did not offer a very good investment
opportunity, and enterprises relied on forced sales of bonds to employ-
ees to raise funds, causing the State Council to issue a directive requir-
ing that internal debenture subscriptions be voluntary and short term.36
In addition to the stress put on government, banks, other SOEs, and
workers to supply capital, the SOEs' drain on available finance has hurt
the efficient enterprises. For example, with so much financing going to
SOEs, the capital available to other enterprises is greatly reduced.37
30. Zhao & Li, supra note 25, at 8. This is in addition to the control the state wields by
virtue of owning the assets. See infra part I.B.
31. Tsang, supra note 29, at 1. The amount of money that banks have tied up in bad
loans to SOEs has made the banks one of the greatest opponents of SOE bankruptcy; given
that the government has only set aside seven billion yuan to cover the loans, the banks are
unlikely to be repaid if the SOEs go bankrupt. Foo Choy Peng, supra note 21, at 1.
32. Zhao & Li, supra note 25, at 8.
33. Cycle of Debt at Heart of Problem, supra note 19, at 24. Indeed, "[iun some compa-
nies, the debt chain has grown to previously unheard of proportions. China's largest iron and
steel works ... owes other enterprises six billion yuan ... and, in turn, is owed eight billion
yuan." Id.
34. Id.
35. Zhao & Li, supra note 25, at 8.
36. Id. at 8 (citing the Directive of the State Council on Tightening Government's
Control of Internal Debentures).
37. Up to two-thirds of private enterprises have trouble obtaining credit because so much
capital is tied up in SOEs. Tsang, supra note 29, at 1. Philbrick notes that "a lack of capital
has been one of the most formidable obstacles to a sustainable free market" because industry
and agriculture - the two vital components of a functioning economy - rely on capital to
generate output, replace broken parts, and modernize outdated and inefficient processes.
William C. Philbrick, The Paving of Wall Street in Eastern Europe: Establishing the Legal
Infrastructure for Stock Markets in the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 25 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 565 (1994). This is no less true for a socialist market economy. In
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Moreover, printing money to finance the SOEs has contributed to high
inflation, which amounts to a tax on the efficient enterprises.38 The
SOEs' inefficiency has thus begun to affect the healthier parts of the
economy, creating a need for reform that the government could not
ignore.
2. Social Instability
SOE inefficiency is also a source, albeit an indirect one, of social
unrest. First, the savings rate in China is forty percent of disposable
income, 39 amounting to an estimated U.S. $310 billion in 1992.40 Some
have speculated that such massive wealth constitutes a potential political
threat to the Chinese Communist Party.
41
Moreover, with few other investment outlets,42 Chinese citizens are
eager to invest in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. 43 These invest-
ment outlets are jealously guarded. Fights apparently are common in
lines at brokerages, 44 and in 1992, when corruption in the allocation of
shares in a new issue was discovered, riots involving 50,000 would-be
Gansu province, for example, government officials complain that "[I]ack of investment is the
main difficulty in the modernisation of state enterprises." Chan Wai-fong, Scarce Investment
Hampers Reform, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 23, 1994, at 7.
38. Kaye, supra note 22, at 51.
39. Lena H. Sun, Stock Market Fever Is Taking Hold in China, WASH. POST, May 2,
1992, at C I.
40. Bersani, supra note 11, at 304. The growth stems from the fact that incomes have
tripled in the last ten years. See David Fairlamb, Surging, Churning China, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Jan. 1993, at 33, 35.
41. See Bersani, supra note 11, at 304 (citing an unpublished Ph.D. thesis).
42. Savings accounts typically do not have high enough rates of return to compensate for
inflation. Roller Coaster Ride: China Is Trying to Curb Volatility and Entice More Investors,
ASIAWEEK, Nov. 30, 1994, at 49. The same is true for government bonds, although their
return is over one percent higher than savings accounts. China's Bond Markets Come of Age:
From Forced Sales to Feeding Frenzy, Bus. CHINA, July 25, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Buchin File.
43. Fairlamb, supra note 40, at 35. Investing in stocks is enormously popular. Even prior
to the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges in 1990 and 1991, respectively,
trading occurred on the street, and such trades continued immediately after the openings
because few companies at the time were listed on the exchanges. Securities Trading on
Shanghai Exchange: Few Stocks to Buy, Bus. CHINA, Feb. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Buchin File. People flock to "salons" to discuss investment tips, Hundreds
Flock to Shanghai Stock Market "Salon", Reuter Asia Pacific Bus. Rep., Aug. 8, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuapb File, and securities-related book sales have at
times been as high as 700 books a day, Sun, Stock Market Fever, supra note 39, at CL. Some
cities are clamoring to be the next to open legal securities exchanges, id., and illegal stock
exchanges have developed to service investor demand, Lena H. Sun, China's New Ideology:
Make Money, Not Marxism, WASH. POST, July 27, 1993, at Al, A12. Another sign of high
demand is the excessive prices of stocks. Securities Trading on Shanghai Exchange, supra.
44. Fairlamb, supra note 40, at 35.
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investors broke out in Shenzhen.45 Hence, the inability of SOEs to
provide an investment outlet for Chinese citizens, and the ensuing threat
to social stability, is a second factor prodding the government to restruc-
ture the SOEs. 46
3. Inability to Compete with the Nonstate Sector
Another problem stemming from SOE inefficiency is an inability to
compete with the nonstate sector. In .contrast to SOEs, which "employ
too many people, produce goods that consumers do not want, locate in
economically inefficient places, [and] do not upgrade their capital
stock ... the nonstate sector is performing well. Between 1980 and
1992, collectives grew at an average annual rate of 18.4 percent, and
individual and private firms grew at average annual rates of 64.9 percent
and 37.2 percent, respectively.48 Private firms now account for eighty
percent of all commercial retail, catering, and service establishments,49
and the nonstate sector as a whole accounts for sixty percent of industri-
al output.5° This lopsided performance is a political embarrassment for a
government that has-enshrined the primacy of state sector leadership in
its constitution. 5'
The pressure on SOEs from this lopsided performance is compound-
ed by events outside of China. China regards itself as a leader in Asia,
but it is surrounded by newly industrializing countries (NICs) that have
achieved phenomenal growth with a significant role for private enter-
45. Sheryl WuDunn, Rioting Over Stock Issues Poses Challenge for Chinese, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at D14.
46. Of course, the SOEs' inability to provide an investment outlet stems as much from
their structure as their inefficiency. Moreover, the potential for unrest also limits the reforms
that the government can undertake. Any reform will have to include eventual dismantling of
the iron rice bowl, the system of guaranteed employment and social services provided by
SOEs. With no national social safety net, the government fears major social discontent.
Josephine Ma & Zhang Yuan, Moves to Bankrupt Ailing Enterprises, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 20, 1994, at 12. Another source of social discontent that discourages reform is the
widening income gap produced by people's ability to make money off of the stock market.
Sun, China's New Ideology, supra note 43, at A12.
47. Maxim Boycko et al., Privatizing Russia, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 139, 141 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1993).
48. Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 7, at 4, Table I. In the first half of 1994, SOEs grew
at 4.4% while collectives grew at the rate of 20.3% and private and foreign-owned enterprises
grew at the rate of 28.9%. Daniel Kwan, Statistics Paint Bleak Picture for State Firms, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1994, at 9.
49. Li Rongxia, China Expands Development of Private Economy, BEIJING REV., June
20-26, 1994, at 18.
50. See O'Neill, State Sector Shrinks, supra note 18.
51. As Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua has pointed out, reforming SOEs is as much a political
as an economic problem because the state-owned sector is so tied to the principles of social-
ism. Xiao Yu, supra note 21, at 8.
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prise. 2 More recently, the changes in the former Soviet bloc mean that
China is the last major socialist economy.53 Reform of the SOEs has
thus been turned into a matter of political pride, making China's leader-
ship decidedly defensive about the performance of its SOEs.
54
To summarize, because SOEs are so important, their inefficiency has
led to a variety of problems, including threats to the rest of the econo-
my, to social stability, and to China's political foundation. Some have
argued in response to these threats that the nonstate sector will simply
replace the poorly performing state sector so that any attempts to reform
the SOEs is useless.55
There are a couple of problems with this argument, however. First,
such a course of action is unpalatable to a leadership that wants to retain
the primacy of the state sector. Moreover, such a conquest of the state
sector is unlikely in the short term, and the threats that SOEs' inefficien-
cy poses to the rest of the economy and to the social stability are prob-
lems requiring immediate solutions. The Chinese government thus turn-
ed to SOE reform.
In order to decide what to do about the SOEs, however, it is first
necessary to understand what it is about the SOEs that have led to such
poor performance and consequently to the problems discussed above.
This question is the focus of the next section.
B. The Ambiguous State-Enterprise Property Relationship
Numerous SOE characteristics have been pinpointed as the source of
SOEs' inefficiency, including operation under a soft budget constraint,
micromanagement by the state, and the use of the SOEs to pursue aims
unrelated to profit.56 While these may be typical of SOE behavior, and
52. See Lieberman, supra note 24, at 10 (pointing out that the success of NICs has been
a major reason for the surge in privatization).
53. Id. at 11.
54. Officials have begun to speak of the "heavy burden [SOEs have] shouldered" over
the years, without which China would not have achieved such high growth rates. This burden
is said to include extremely high taxes, an unequal competitive environment given preferential
treatment for other types of enterprises, and the provision of social services. Wu Naitao, '95
Goals for Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, BEIJING REV., Jan. 9-15, 1995, at 7, 9.
55. See Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township Village Enterprises as
Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121, 121 (1994) (stating that "state
enterprises, particularly medium and small ones, are pushed, outcompeted, and outgrown by
non-state sector firms and are gradually replaced in the long run").
56. These types of behavior will be discussed in more detail infra part I.B.3.
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may be the immediate causes of SOE inefficiency, SOEs do not by
definition have these characteristics5 7
Instead, these inefficient behaviors are made more likely by a more
fundamental problem, the relationship between the state and the SOEs.
As one scholar noted: "a decisive influence upon the enterprises' effi-
ciency, financial performance, and social obligations ... is exercised by
the enterprises' relationships with their governments, so that, if these
relationships are wrong, little will come right." 8 In China, as the follow-
ing sections will show, the problem that makes the relationship between
the state and the enterprise "wrong" is the ambiguity in the state-enter-
prise property relationship with regard to the state's and the SOEs'
respective claims to assets.
1. The Importance of Clear Property Rights
In theory, clear property rights are necessary for the proper function-
ing of a market economy.5 9 As Andrei Baev states:
In order for a commodity market to exist it is necessary for those
subjects who initially intend to alienate and appropriate exchange-
able goods ... to be in command of the goods .... In other
words, they must be able to possess, use and control goods in
accordance with their own interests and by their own free will.
Traditionally, the term "ownership" has been used for the defini-
tion of such a relationship. 6°
Two concepts must be explored more fully: (1) what is ownership, and
(2) why does it matter.
57. As a 1983 World Bank report stated, " '[t]he key factor determining the efficiency of
an enterprise is not whether it is publicly or privately owned .... In thoery, it is possible to
create the kind of incentives that will maximize efficiency under any type of ownership.'"
AHARONI, supra note 5, at 42 (quoting a World Bank report); see also id. at 59-60.
58. Maurice R. Garner, The Relationship Between Government and Public Enterprise, in
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 3, 5 (G. Ram Reddy ed., 1983). Another scholar
noted: "The behavior of an SOE is also a function ... mainly of [its] relationship with the
government." AHARONI, supra note 5, at 42 (emphasis added).
59. As Wang has noted, this is a utilitarian concept of property rights with its roots in
wealth maximization, making the concept seem unsuited to analysis of a socialist system.
However, given that that socialist system is trying to force its enterprises to be wealth
maximizers, the use of such a utilitarian theory to analyze the problems of the SOEs is
worthwhile. Wang, supra note 4, at 122.
60. Baev, supra note 9, at 132.
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a. Ownership Defined
The concept of "ownership" can be divided into any number of
rights,61 but with respect to enterprise ownership, it is typically divided
into two groups. First, the owner has the right to allocate the surpluses
and losses from the enterprise. 62 Second, ownership involves control
over enterprise operations.63 The owner may exercise such control
directly, in which case the owner has the right to possess and the cor-
responding right to exclude others from possession, as well as the right
to use and dispose of the thing possessed.' The owner may also exer-
cise control indirectly, by appointing and dismissing managers and by
setting the terms by which they are employed.65
b. Importance of Clear Ownership Rights
The question remains as to why clear ownership rights matter. Clear
ownership rights can promote efficient behavior in two ways.
First, the act of defining clear ownership rights, even without regard
to how those rights are allocated, can provide important incentives to
use assets productively. As Demsetz stated, "property rights derive their
significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations
which he can reasonably hold in dealing with others.' Without those
expectations, people are unable to predict whether they will have a
given set of assets at their disposal and are thus less likely to make the
61. Wang, supra note 4, at 122-23.
62. DONALD HAY ET AL., ECONOMIC REFORM AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN
CHINA, 1979-1987 422 (1994); Weitzman & Xu, supra note 55, at 124; Wang, supra note 4,
at 123. Chinese law similarly incorporates the right to "benefit" into the right of ownership.
Qian, supra note 11, at 78 n.61.
63. HAY, supra note 62, at 423. Some authors have divided this notion of control into
two separate ownership rights: possession and use. See Weitzman & Xu, supra note 55, at
124; Wang, supra note 4, at 123. Chinese law in effect divides this element of control into
three separate rights - possession, use, and disposition. See Qian, supra note 11, at 78 n.61.
64. The owner is:
the common party to the set of contracts, can negotiate and renegotiate any or all
of them, as a result can determine who will be parties to the contract and who
therefore will participate in the enterprise. By these means he can determine its
objectives, functions, and operations, and whether it will continue to exist or not.
HAY, supra note 62, at 423; see also Weitzman & Xu, supra note 55, at 124; Wang, su-
pra note 4, at 123.
65. HAY, supra note 62, at 423.
66. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347, 348
(1967), cited in Wang, supra note 4, at 122.
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most efficient use of those assets.67 At a minimum, then, a system must
"parcel out some (or most) of the constituent rights of ownership into a
bundle of rights which are clearly defined and legally protected.,
68
However, clear ownership rights are not necessarily enough; it is
equally important that ownership rights, once allocated, are allocated in
the way that is most likely to produce efficient behavior. Specifically, an
enterprise has what are known as "residual risk holders." In order for
these risk holders to be willing to accept risk, they must (1) be compen-
sated for holding that risk by being the owner (and therefore having
control over the enterprise's operations and profit and loss distribution)
or (2) be able to escape the risk by selling the right to hold it.69
If either of these two conditions, exists, the owners of the enterprise
are likely to behave efficiently. First, if the owners bear the risk, they
have an incentive to maximize enterprise performance since the conse-
quences of success or failure accrue to them. Second, if the risk holders
are not the owners but can sell the right to bear the risk, the owners still
have an incentive to be efficient, since if the enterprise does not perform
well, it will be difficult to find people who will hold the risk. Thus,
when defining ownership rights in a situation where no market for
residual risk exists (so condition (2) above cannot be satisfied), it is
important to make the owner hold the risk in order to promote efficient
behavior.
2. The Ambiguous State-Enterprise Property Relationship in China
In China, ownership rights to state-owned assets are anything but
well defined. One scholar has described the state-enterprise property
relationship as one in which the state "legally owns the major means of
production managed by the enterprises., 70 Although state ownership
67. See infra notes 81 and 82 and accompanying text.
68. Wang, supra note 4, at 134.
69. HAY, supra note 62, at 423. Hay notes that this is the basis of the distinction
between a publicly traded and a closely held corporation. In the closely held corporation, the
people in control are the ones who bear the residual risk; in a publicly traded corporation, the
residual risk bearers are shareholders who do not typically have much control but who are
able to escape the risk they hold by selling their shares. Id.
70. Wang, supra note 4, at 91 n.5. Technically, the major means of production are
owned by "the whole people," with ownership rights exercised by the state as the representa-
tive of the whole people. See PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 17, art. 6 ("The basis of the
socialist economic system ... is ... ownership by the whole people .... ); Conner, supra
note 16, at 2 n.4 (equating ownership by the whole people with ownership by the state); see
also Baev, supra note 9, at 133 (discussing the concept of state ownership in socialist theory
generally).
Clarke cautions that the state is not the monolithic entity that the term implies. SOEs'
relationships may be with any one of several governmental units, and these units may have
conflicting aims. Clarke, supra note 1, at 7.
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does not necessarily mean the state will exercise control, 71 state owner-
ship certainly creates the potential for such control. At the same time,
the SOEs are clearly expected to exercise some rights of control to carry
out the enterprise's productive functions. 72 Those rights have been very
poorly defined, 7 however, leaving a state-enterprise property relation-
ship that is "like an incomplete contract, with only one party, the state,
supplying additional terms on an ongoing basis. '74 The consequence of
this uncertainty is a culture of state intervention, to which this Note now
turns.
3. The Culture of State Intervention
When the state and the SOE have claims on the same assets, the two
entities become intertwined, increasing the likelihood that state owner-
ship of assets will in fact result in state control. Specifically, when the
SOEs' supervisory units have the legal power to make decisions regard-
ing the use of assets assigned to the SOEs, those supervisory units
become responsible to higher levels of government for the performance
of the SOEs. Policy debate then begins to revolve around the needs of
individual SOEs, and government power is used to address those
needs.7 1 In the end, "it is clear that in practice the ownership of enter-
prises is in the hands of the institutions of the state. It is they which
control managers through powers of appointment, dismissal, and the
power to set remuneration, and it is they which allocate residual risk.
76
Such state control decreases the incentives for efficient behavior.
First, since the state's rights trump the SOEs' rights,77 the SOEs can
form no expectations about how the state will act. The state may, for
example, reallocate assets from one SOE to another without paying
market value compensation.78 In addition, since no market for residual
risk in Chinese SOEs exists, at least not prior to the opening of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets,79 the way to provide incentives
71. AHARONI, supra note 5, at 7.
72. Qian, supra note 11, at 102.
73. For more detail, see infra part I.C (discussing three major legislative attempts to
delineate the state's and the SOEs' respective claims to state property).
74. Wang, supra note 4, at 123. As Baev explains, "the term 'property of the whole
people' does not provide straight and clear answers to the question of 'whose is it."' Baev,
supra note 9, at 133.
75. OLIVER LETWIN, PRIVATIZING THE WORLD 29-32 (1988).
76. HAY, supra note 62, at 426.
77. Wang, supra note 4, at 123.
78. Id. at 115.
79. See HAY, supra note 62, at 426. As will be seen infra part In, active trading on the
stock markets is expected to improve SOE efficiency because the risk holders can now escape
risk by selling it.
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for the state as owner to be efficient is to make the state bear the risk.
The state in the case of China, however, may allocate that risk to others,
for example, to the population through higher or lower public expendi-
tures or to other enterprises through taxation.8°
Hence, the constraints on inefficient behavior, from the point of
view of. either management or the state, are minimal. The result is a
variety of inefficient behaviors.
For example, due to the inability to form expectations about asset
use, SOE managers are reluctant to make long term investment decisions
to maintain capital and equipment.8 Moreover, since no matter how
well an SOE performs, the state typically decides its profits, the SOE
does not have an incentive to invest in, for example, good manage-
ment.82
In addition, when the state, through the supervisory units, makes
decisions for the SOEs, and yet does not bear the risk for those deci-
sions, the supervisory units are more likely to succumb to the temptation
to use SOEs to solve problems that are unrelated to the SOEs' produc-
tive function. For example, in order to solve the problem of regional
underdevelopment and unemployment, the state might force an SOE to
locate in the western part of China, far away from markets. 83 Although
such a move would be detrimental to the SOEs' ability to turn a profit,
the state is isolated from the SOEs' failure and so is not restrained from
using the SOEs in this way.
The state's isolation from risk will lead to other inefficient behaviors
commonly observed in SOEs as well. For example, the supervisory units
will attempt to "help" their SOEs through enterprise specific regulations
that provide some benefit to the SOEs, such as a supply of valuable
inputs. Such regulations, of course, are detrimental to the SOEs in terms
of efficiency: "high-priced inputs are supposed to go to those enterprises
which, because they produce a valuable product, can afford them, not to
those that can persuade their supervisory government organ to supply
them."' Yet, the state, at least in the short term, has nothing to lose
from such behavior.
Another example of how the state's isolation from risk will lead to
inefficient behavior involves the soft budget constraint. The soft budget
constraint exists when "the difference between the profits of production
and the costs of production is not a matter of life and death for the
80. Id.
81. Wang, supra note 4, at 115-16.
82. Id. at 116-17.
83. Kaye, supra note 22, at 51.
84. Clarke, supra note 1, at 16. This is the problem of micromanagement.
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firm." 85 Many of the conditions that create a soft budget constraint are
directly related to the supervisory unit's responsibility for, and willing-
ness to respond to pleas for help from, the SOEs,86 coupled with the
state's isolation from the obvious inefficiency of allowing SOEs to
operate without regard to costs.
8 7
In short, the ambiguity in the state-enterprise property relationship
has created a culture of state intervention. This culture makes inefficient
behavior more likely, resulting in the SOEs' poor performance and in
the problems outlined supra part I.A. This analysis is not without its
problems, however. In the following section, this Note responds to two
of the more important objections to the ambiguous property relationship
argument.
85. Id. at 9. This allows the SOEs to overhire and produce unwanted products, for
example. For a more detailed explanation of the soft budget constraint, see HAY, supra note
62, at 323-66.
86. For example, the soft budget constraint can exist when the firm can influence tax
rules or can get individual tax exemptions or postponements; when the enterprise receives
grants from the state; and where the firm is granted credit (such as by state-controlled banks)
even when the firm's ability to repay is limited. Clarke, supra note 1, at 9-10.
87. The blurred state-SOE relationship also makes it difficult to solve the soft budget
constraint problem. To make firms operate under a hard budget constraint, firms that cannot
turn a profit must go bankrupt. Wang, supra note 4, at 117-18.
A bankruptcy law did come into effect in 1988. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the
People's Republic of China, reprinted and translated in [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for
Foreign Bus. (CCH) 13-522 (Dec. 2, 1986); see also Clarke, supra note 1, at 51 (explaining
that the law was passed in 1986 but did not come into effect until 1988). The law has rarely
been used, however; although bankruptcies are on the rise, they still represent only a tiny
fraction of the enterprises that are regularly losing money. See Wang, supra note 4, at 118
(no SOEs bankrupt up to 1991); More Than 100 Enterprises Go Bankrupt, Xinhua, July 10,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (two SOEs bankrupt by mid-1992);
Carrie Lee, Bankruptcy Rules Need Overhaul, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 1994, at 3
(twenty SOEs bankrupt by mid-1994).
The Bankruptcy Law has not forced more money-losing SOEs into bankruptcy in part
because of the blurred state-SOE relationship; because ownership rights are not well defined,
it has not been clear what happens to the state-owned assets of bankrupt SOEs. Wang, supra
note 4, at 118. This has ostensibly changed with the passage of the Regulations on Supervis-
ing State-Owned Property of Industrial Enterprises. See infra part III.
Another important reason why firms have not gone bankrupt is, of course, the fear of
widespread discontent from laid off workers. Ma & Zhang, supra note 46, at 12; Clarke,
supra note 1, at 54. Moreover, it is difficult to determine which SOEs should go bankrupt.
Because prices do not accurately measure profits and losses, the Bankruptcy Law contains a
"fault" standard under which SOEs that lose money because of poor management (business
losses) will go bankrupt and SOEs that lose money because of policies like fixed prices
(policy losses) would not go bankrupt. Unfortunately, it is not always clear how to tell policy
losses from business losses. Clarke, supra note 1, at 53.
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4. Critique of the Ambiguous Property Relationship Argument
One problem with the argument that SOEs' inefficiency stems from
the uncertainty with respect to the state's and SOEs' claims to assets is
the contradiction between the theory of state intervention (that the
supervisory units become more responsible for the performance of the
SOE) and the theory of residual risk allocation (that the owners of the
SOE do not bear risk and so do not have an incentive to be efficient).
Indeed, some have argued that the relatively diffuse system of state
administration in China is the impetus behind recent efficiency gains.
The argument is that the supervisory units bear at least some of the
residual risk and use their control to establish incentive mechanisms for
managers through financial rewards, investment funds, promotions, and
so forth.8
The state, however, can still allocate the residual risk to others, like
the population, who have no .way to divest themselves of that risk.89
Moreover, there is still considerable scope for other objectives - social
ones stemming from other responsibilities of the state or private ones of
the government officials in control - to play a role in government
decisionmaking regarding the enterprise.90
Another problem with the ambiguous property relationship argument
is that it is contradicted by the success of collective enterprises like the
township-village enterprises (TVEs). It has been argued that " 'there is
no fundamental distinction to be made between state and collective
enterprises.' State and collective firms have different charactersitics, but
in both cases, 'the central fact' is that 'government and party officials'
exercise 'all rights to control, income flows, and sale or liquidation.' "91
Moreover, the argument goes, property relationships in collectives are
just as ambiguous as in SOEs.92 Nevertheless, collective enterprises,
especially TVEs, are performing well.93 Under this logic, the state-
enterprise property relationship cannot be causing SOE problems.
88. HAY, supra note 62, at 427.
89. "[A]lthough the decentralized structure creates some pressures on local authorities,
residual risk can still be allocated to the population irrespective of the latter's preferences and
with no scope for them to divest themselves of that risk." Id. at 428 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.; see also id. at 427-30 for a more thorough discussion of the problems with
single agency ownership in China.
.. 91. Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 7, at 5. These authors even lump SOEs and collec-
tives together for purposes of discussing the " 'surprise' element in China's recent industrial
achievements" - the continued dominance of the public sector in industrial output. Id. at
3-5.
92. See Weitzman & Xu, supra note 55, at 122 ("A TVE is ... very far removed from
having well-defined property rights.").
93. Id. at 127-29; Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 7, at 4, Table I.
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A clear difference between the SOEs and the collectives exists,
however. The state sector's share of industrial output has plummeted in
the past fifteen years while the collectives' share has skyrocketed. 94 In
addition, collectives and SOEs are distinguished in the PRC Constitu-
tion95 and are governed by different legislation.96
The question is whether the difference between SOEs and collec-
tives can stem from the differences between the state-SOE and state-
collective property relationships. The state-SOE property relationship
does differ structurally from the state-collective property relationship. In
a collective, the assets are owned collectively by a (relatively) small
number of people, the people in the community, and the community
government exercises the ownership rights as the representatives of
those people.97 In an SOE, by contrast, the assets are owned by a more
amorphous group, "the whole people," with the ownership rights exer-
cised by government representatives at any one of several levels of
government.9" The effect, it would seem, would be to make the collec-
tives' managers more responsive to the actual owners of the assets,
while the managers of the SOE are more responsive to the political
leadership in the central government. 99 Clarification of the state-enter-
prise property relationship is thus necessary to reforming the SOEs.
C. Solutions
China has attempted many times to define the SOEs' rights to use
state-owned assets. The first major attempt came in 1983 with the
enactment of the Provisional Rules for State Industrial Enterprises (1983
Rules). ° The 1983 Rules allowed for some decisions affecting state
assets to be made by the SOEs, but only after they had fulfilled the
tasks set out for them by their supervisory units. 10' This meant the
94. Jefferson & Rawski, supra note 7, at 4, Table I (showing that, between 1978 and
1992, the state sector's share of industrial output has declined from 76% to 48.4% while the
share of rural collectives has increased from 9,9% to 26.2%).
95. See PRC CONSTTUTION, supra note 17, art. 6.
96. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 16 (describing the legislation covering both SOEs and
urban and rural collectives).
97. Weitzman & Xu, supra note 55, at 126-27; Conner, supra note 16, at 2 n.4.
98. See supra notes 70 and accompanying text (defining the SOE).
99. See LETWIN, supra note 75, at 29-32 (suggesting that SOE managers respond to the
center).
100. Provisional Regulations of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, reprinted and
translated in [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH) 13-500 (Apr. 1, 1983).
101. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 3.
[Vol. 16:911
Spring 19951 Reforming the State-Enterprise Property Relationship 929
SOEs' rights fluctuated with decisions by the supervisory units -
hardly a clarification of the property relationship.
A more formal attempt to clarify the state-enterprise property rela-
tionship came in 1988 with the Law of the PRC on Industrial Enter-
prises Owned by the Whole People (State Industrial Enterprise Law).'
2
This law defines the rights of the SOE to use the state-owned assets by
instituting the idea of "enterprise operating rights." Although the State
Industrial Enterprise Law clearly indicates that ownership and operating
rights are separate, it defines operating rights in such a way that they
seem virtually indistinguishable from ownership rights.10 3 Even a cursory
reading of the law, however, shows what the distinction between the
two types of rights must be: the phrase "in accordance with State Coun-
cil Regulations" is ubiquitous in articles delineating enterprise operating
rights, 4 suggesting that the state has the ability to trump the SOEs'
operating rights virtually at will. 05
The last major attempt to define the state-enterprise property rela-
tionship was embodied in the 1992 Regulations on Transforming the
Management Mechanisms of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises (1992
Regulations). 1°6 The 1992 Regulations are apparently the main body of
"State Council regulations" to which the State Industrial Enterprise Law
referred."° The 1992 Regulations are fairly successful in spelling out the
respective rights of possession, use, and benefit of the state and the
SOEs. For example, the 1992 Regulations define the functions of the
government in exercising its ownership rights0 8 and the management's
102. Law of the People's Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the
Whole People, reprinted and translated in [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH)
13-534 (Apr. 13, 1988) [hereinafter State Industrial Enterprise Law]. For detailed discus-
sions of the State Industrial Enterprise Law, see Feinerman, supra note 17; Wang, supra note
4.
103. See Wang, supra note 4, at 103. See also State Industrial Enterprise Law, supra
note 102, art. 2 (defining operating rights as the right "to possess, use and legally dispose of
property which the state has authorized it to operate and manage"); Civil Law of the People's
Republic of China, art. 71, reprinted and translated in [3 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign
Bus. (CCH) 19-150 (Apr. 12, 1986) (defining ownership rights as the right "to possess, use
and legally dispose of" property).
104. See State Industrial Enterprise Law, supra note 102, arts. 27, 28, 29, 34; see also id.
art. 24 ("unless State Council regulations prescribe otherwise"); id. arts. 31 and 34 ("in
accordance with the law and State Council regulations"); id. art. 33 ("Except if the law or
statutory regulations prescribe otherwise"); see also LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 4-5.
105. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 4-5.
106. Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanisms of State-Owned
Industrial Enterprises, translated in FBIS China Daily Report, July 28, 1992, at 27 [hereinaf-
ter 1992 Regulations].
107. LiCHTENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 4-5.
108. 1992 Regulations, supra note 106, arts. 40-46.
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authority"° and gives the SOEs the right to complain and eventually to
sue to enforce those rights. 1 The 1992 Regulations also further clarify
the SOEs' responsibility for profits and losses."'
The result has been interesting. Although managers started " 'earn-
ing smartly[,] ... the fruits of their exertions tended to pile up in the
bank accounts of their offshore subsidiaries or putative partners, rather
than on the balance sheets of the mother enterprises.' .i. It therefore ap-
pears that something more than defining the state-enterprise property
relationship on paper is needed to change behavior; to determine what
that "something more" might be, the next section examines how other
economies in transition have dealt with the problems of the SOEs.
II. LESSONS OF PRIVATIZATION
A. Privatization as a Solution
Inefficient SOEs are certainly not unique to China. 13 It is therefore
useful to examine the primary solution for SOE inefficiency sweeping
the world: privatization.1
4
Privatization is somewhat difficult to define. From a legal point of
view, "privatization is the single act of transferring ... the legal title of
state property, which was in the possession of state enterprises for
restricted purposes of producing certain goods under owner-state control,
to individual or associated owners" in order for owners to acquire
109. Id. arts. 6-22.
110. Id. arts. 47-49.
111. Id. arts. 23-30.
112. Kaye, supra note 22, at 52. Moreover, the government admits that it has had some
trouble in implementing the 1992 Regulations. See Wu, supra note 54, at 11 (stating that one
of the keys to the reform of SOEs was the implementation of the 1992 Regulations).
113. Lieberman, for example, states that SOEs in general are characterized in part by
"poor financial performance, overstaffing, dependence on subsidies and unilateral budget
transfers, [and] highly centralized and politicized organizations .... Lieberman, supra note
24, at 10.
114. Almost 7,000 SOEs in 70 countries were privatized between 1980 and 1992. World
Bank: Privatization is Increasing Globally, Bus. AMERCA, June 1, 1992, at 19. Privatization
was chosen as the solution to SOE inefficiency for a number of reasons: (1) the successful
economic performance of Japan and the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries, all of which
allowed a very significant role for the private sector; (2) growing recognition that other
models of economic development, such as the command economy, had outlived their useful-
ness; (3) the development of new managerial practices like "total quality control" that can
have profound effects on productivity and competitiveness and that have in large part passed
by countries not adopting models relying on private enterprise; (4) the importance of SOEs in
the economy coupled with'their poor economic performance; and (5) the ideological commit-
ment to private enterprise expressed by advanced industrial countries like the United States
and the United Kingdom. Lieberman, supra note 24, at 10.
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"certain legal absolute rights of possession, to use and command said
property in accordance with their free will, their own interest, and by
their own power over property.. ' ...
The idea is that the transfer of assets will solve the ambiguity in the
state-enterprise property relationship by doing away with the relationship
altogether. One consequence of the asset transfer is that the lines be-
tween the SOEs and the state become clearer."t 6 Indeed, the very mecha-
nisms that allowed the state to influence the firms are dismantled.
11 7
Moreover, privatization ends the responsibility of government units for
the performance of the SOE in general and keeps governmental units
from making a number of specific decisions, like whom to appoint as
manager. 8 Finally, when shareholders gain the right to profits, it be-
comes difficult for politicians to exert influence over the enterprise
because the shareholders constitute a political constituency opposed to
government intervention." 9
Privatization also affects managers' incentives. The enterprise be-
comes subject to the disciplines of the financial market place, meaning
that the need to achieve adequate returns in order to obtain access to
private sector financing is likely to make managers focus on "cost
control, responsibility to the customer, commercial advantage, and the
economic case for any specific investment."' 20 Privatization thus seems
to address the incentive problems related to state ownership.
Privatization in practice has proven to be much more complex,
however. First, privatization is but one aspect - the enterprise restruc-
turing aspect - of the entire process of decentralization.' More fun-
115. Baev, supra note 9, at 150-51 (emphasis omitted).
116. Although they can never be entirely clear. For example, the government can still
repossess property through eminent domain powers, even in a substantially privatized econo-
my.
117. Boycko, supra note 47, at 145; Baev, supra note 9, at 137.
118. LETWIN, supra note 75, at 33.
119. Boycko, supra note 47, at 145. One author cautions that it is impossible to tell
whether privatized firms operate better than they did when they were government owned
because no firm can operate simultaneously under private and public ownership. That means
any successes may result from third party factors that have nothing to do with privatization.
LETWIN, supra note 75, at 35-37. Nevertheless, the disparity in performance between the
private and state sectors makes it reasonable to suppose that shareholders would be less than
pleased with state intervention.
120. LETWIN, supra note 75, at 33.
121. Baev, supra note 9, at 136-37; see also supra note 9 (discussing Baev's division of
decentralization into demonopolization, deintegration, and privatization). The success of other
aspects of reform are crucial to the success of privatization. Reform of pricing is essential, for
example. To measure a firm's success based on profits and losses does not make the firm
efficient when those profits and losses are generated from artificially low prices. Clarke,
supra note 1, at 12.
Michigan Journal of International Law
damentally, however, privatization has proven to be more than just a
legal shift in title to the assets. It cannot be ignored that privatization is
also (1) "a process of socio-economic transformation of the foundation
of socialist centralized economies by means of transferring state assets
and state enterprises to the private sector"'122 and (2) a political transfor-
mation." There are indications that the socio-economic and political
transformations do not always accompany the legal transfer. Specifical-
ly, assets may be transferred to new owners who do not understand their
new role because they operate with a set of expectations about rights
developed from historical intervention by the state. The state may also
be reluctant to come to terms with its new role. Finally, the people to
whom ownership is transferred may simply be overwhelmed by the new
authority and abuse it. In such circumstances, privatization will not
result in any change in behavior because the state-enterprise property
relationship has only been abolished on paper. Reform must thus effect
both a legal transformation and a cultural transformation.
l
2
B. Privatization in China
Privatization itself has been rejected as a solution in China for a
variety of reasons. First, while it is true that the private sector in China
is flourishing, 125 privatization requires a willingness to "abolish[] the
basis of the whole socialist command system, the concept of state
ownership."' 2 6 This the government is most definitely not willing to
do. 1
27
122. Baev, supra note 9, at 150 (emphasis added).
123. Boycko, supra note 47, at 143.
124. In a recent report on the success of privatization around the world, the World Bank
did not explicitly discuss this cultural transformation, but their "check list" of factors that
tended to be present in successful privatization programs suggested that in those programs
some sort of cultural transformation had taken place. The list includes:
(1) The more market-friendly a country's policy framework ... the less
difficulty it will have in privatizing an SOE, and the higher the likeli-
hood that the sale will turn out positively.
(2) SOEs functioning in competitive markets, or in markets easily made
competitive, are prime candidates for privatization .... [Tihey require
little or no regulation.
(4) Countries can benefit from privatizing management ....
SUNITA KIKERI ET AL., PRIVATIZATION: THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 11 (1992).
125. See supra part I.A.3.
126. Baev, supra note 9, at 137.
127. It is not that there have not been arguments for privatization within the scholarly
community in China. At one point during the debates over whether to allow stock markets in
China, for example, scholars proposed a system whereby the value of enterprises would be
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Moreover, privatization is but a step - the last step - in the
structural reform of SOEs. Many commentators have noted that it is first
necessary for the SOEs to restructure and only once restructuring is
complete to privatize. 128 Thus, even if the Chinese leadership was will-
ing to do away with the socialist system of ownership entirely, SOEs
may not be at a stage in structural development where privatization is
possible.
Nevertheless, privatization holds one lesson for China. The problem
with China's previous attempts at restructuring the SOEs, particularly
the 1992 Regulations, is that they have changed the relationship between
the state and the SOEs on paper but have not addressed the culture of
state intervention that the ambiguous state-enterprise relationship fos-
tered. The 1992 Regulations are unlikely to separate the SOE from the
government, not because the regulations are deficient,129 or because the
legal system is less than developed, 130 but because the SOEs have rela-
tionships, and concomitant expectations about those relationships, with
each other and with the government that keep them from behaving
according to the rules set down in the regulations.131 SOE managers
have thus reacted to the 1992 Regulations by appropriating the resulting
profits for themselves: they expect that, regardless of what the 1992
Regulations give them, the profits will be confiscated by the government
or other SOEs.
The government believes that corporatizing the SOEs will help to
change this relationship by making it more difficult for either the gov-
divided into shares that would be distributed among the people in the community and
euphemistically labeled this system the "individualization of state-owned property." Qian,
supra note 11, at 78-79. In the end, though, the government rejected these types of solutions.
So adamant is the government that the establishment of the modem enterprise system "be
implemented 'under the premise of the consolidation of the state-owned sector,' " Xiao Yu,
supra note 21, at 8, that even the assets of bankrupt enterprises cannot be sold to private
operators but only to " 'legal bodies, carrying out appropriate activities.'" Chan Wai-Fong,
Guidelines Set for Selling State Firms, S.CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1994, at 8. It should
be noted that other similar solutions - such as multiple agency ownership - have been
considered. For a more thorough discussion of multiple agency ownership, see HAY, supra
note 62, at 430.
128. Wang, supra note 4, at 130; Lieberman, supra note 24, at 15.
129. See supra part I.C.
130. Although the legal system clearly has its problems. Clarke cites the judges' lack of
education, corruption in the system, the potential that judges' decisions will be overridden by
higher authorities inside and outside of the court system, and the lack of enforcement capabil-
ities. Clarke, supra note 1, at 57.
131. Id. at 41. Often, the supervisory unit or another SOE typically has something to
withhold that the SOE wants, restricting the SOE's actions. As examples, Clarke says that
schools can refuse to admit the children of employees from an SOE, thereby obtaining some
form of exaction from the SOE. In the case where the SOE complained to higher authorities,
the SOE was "told to pay up for the sake of good relations." Id.
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emnment or the managers to behave as they do under the current regime.
The final section of this Note examines whether corporatization will
effect the much needed cultural transformation.
III. THE CORPORATIZED STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE
A. The Modem Enterprise System
The latest effort to restructure the state-enterprise property relation-
ship is the "modem enterprise system." According to the government,
the way to clarify property relationships in a way that changes behavior
is to establish the "legal entity status" of the SOEs, which means that
"the state possesses ownership of the property and that enterprises
possess independent legal property rights and accordingly enjoy rights
and shoulder responsibilities under civil law.' ' 132 The SOEs can achieve
the "legal entity status" by assuming the form of a modem enterprise.
Although "modem enterprises" include sole proprietorships and partner-
ships, 33 the chief structural form of the modem enterprise system is the
corporation because, of the three, the corporation most clearly establish-
es the legal entity status of the SOEs.1
34
132. Modern Enterprise System Investigation and Study Group, Establish a Modern
Enterprise System That Is in Keeping with the Socialist Market Economic Structure, RENMIN
RIBAO, Dec. 21, 1993, at 5, translated in FBIS China Daily Report, Jan. 19, 1994, at 52, 53
[hereinafter Establish a Modern Enterprise System].
133. Id. at 54.
134. Geng, supra note 24, at 5 ("The key to the goal lies in the establishment of an
enterprise corporate system."); Establish a Modern Enterprise System, supra note 132, at 57
("The corporation is an effective organizational pattern of the modem enterprise system.").
The government has already selected 100 large- and medium-sized SOEs to experiment with
implementing this most extreme version of the modem enterprise system until 1996, with full
implementation by 2000. Xiao Yu, supra note 21, at 8.
The government is moving rather slowly with corporatization for several reasons. First,
the leadership has been alarmed by the rapid privatization in Russia. Mark O'Neill, China
Wary of Stock Ownership for State Firms, Reuters Asia Pacific Bus. Rep., Dec. 8, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuapb File. Second, with only weak monetary and
budgetary tools, the government fears a further loss of control over the SOEs. Id. Moreover,
the government sees Chinese investors and the Chinese stock markets as immature. Id.; see
also infra note 141 (discussing the lack of sophistication among Chinese investors). Finally,
the government does not believe that many of the SOEs are ready for corporatization.
Establish a Modern Enterprise System, supra note 132, at 55 ("The majority of enterprises
that have not practiced the corporate system should continue to stick to and perfect the
factory director (manager) responsibility system [established under the State Industrial
Enterprise Law and the 1992 Regulations]."). The state also believes that whether an SOE is
ready for corporatization depends in part on the type of activity in which the SOE is in-
volved. For example, enterprises engaging in special industries like national defense should be
put under direct state control and management or, at most, reorganized as state wholly owned
companies. Id. at 57.
For those enterprises that do not corporatize, the chance of becoming a modern enter-
prise is to "continue to conscientiously implement the" State Industrial Enterprise Law and
the 1992 Regulations. Id. at 57. Since this Note has already examined the efficacy of these
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Under the Company Law, SOEs may become either limited liability
companies, 135 possibly wholly state-owned, or majority state-owned joint
stock limited companies. 36 If the SOEs incorporate as a joint stock
limited company, the shares owned by individuals 37 can be listed on
one of China's two stock exchanges 13 or, more likely, be traded over
the counter. With either a joint stock limited company or a limited
liability company, the state remains the owner of the assets that it
owned prior to incorporation. 39 Under the 1994 Regulation on Super-
vision of Property of State-Owned Enterprises, these assets are to be
managed by "organizations specializing in the control of state-owned
assets.' ' 14°
mechanisms, see supra parts I.C and II.B, this section focuses only on the corporation as the
means of establishing a modem enterprise system.
135. A limited liability company has 2 to 50 shareholders who are liable toward the
company to the extent of their capital contribution, and the company is not obligated to
establish a shareholders' general meeting or a board of directors. Ho, supra note 12, at 10. If
an SOE becomes a limited liability company that is wholly owned by the state, it is called a
"state wholly-owned company." Art & Gu, supra note 11. Since the government fears the
immaturity of Chinese investors, it has recommended that SOEs reorganize as limited liability
companies rather than joint stock limited companies. Establish a Modern Enterprise System,
supra note 132, at 58.
136. A joint stock limited company has more than 50 shareholders who are liable toward
the company to the extent of the shares they hold, and the company is obligated to set up a
shareholders' general meeting and a board of directors. Ho, supra note 12, at 10. In the past,
it has been typical for the state to maintain 51 to 80% of the shares. Bersani, supra note 11,
at 306. The SOEs can issue two other types of shares as well. First is the legal person shares.
Legal persons can be government institutions (thereby increasing the government's control),
universities, SOE subsidiaries, or collectives. The individual shares typically make up 20 to
25% of the total number of shares. Most of these are in turn owned by employees of the
issuer, and individuals typically cannot own more than 0.5% of the shares. Roberta Karmel,
Tossing Capitalism in Shanghai, NEw YORK L.J., Aug. 19, 1993, at 3; Qian, supra note 11, at
87.
137. See supra note 136 (discussing types of shares).
138. Ho, supra note 12, at 12.
139. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 4 ("The ownership of State-owned assets in a
company shall reside with the State."). The Company Law speaks of limited circumstances
where a state wholly owned company that is performing well will be able to exercise owner-
ship rights over assets. Id. art. 72. For differing views as to whether the state must transfer
ownership in the assets to the enterprise in order to achieve the benefits of corporatization,
see Guo Feng, Gufenzhi Qiye Suoyouquan Wenti de Tantao [A Discussion of the Problems of
Ownership in Equity Stock Enterprises], 3 ZHONGGUO FAXUE 3 (1988); Wang Liming, Lun
Gufenzhi Qiye Suoyouquan de Erehong Jiegou: Yu Guo Feng Tongzhi Shangque [Discussing
the Dual Structure of Ownership in Equity Stock Enterprises: A Reply to Comrade Guo
Feng], 1 ZHONGGUO FAXUE 47 (1989). See also Wang, supra note 4, at 119-20 and nn.
149-55 (citing several Chinese writers on the issue of equity stock enterprises in China).
140. China to Stem Losses of State Assets, Xinhua, Aug. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Xinhua File. The new system will consist of "a well-organized work adminis-
tration system, a scientific index system for estimating the economic returns of the
state-owned assets management, a market system on property rights transfer and a complete
set of legislations and law enforcement system on the state~owned assets management." China
to Establish New State-Owned Assets Management System, Xinhua, Nov. 2, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
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As stated above, the government argues above all that this system
will establish clearly defined property rights and change the behavior of
both the state and the SOEs. Although the system is still in a develop-
mental stage so that its success is difficult to predict, the next section of
this Note explores whether the modern enterprise system is likely to
define property rights in such a way that the underlying culture of state
intervention is changed.
B. Clarifying the State-Enterprise Property Relationship
1. Addressing the Immediate Problems
The process of corporatization undoubtedly addresses the immediate
circumstances that prodded the government to restructure SOEs. Al-
though China's stock system is immature,14 ' by allowing SOEs to issue
some shares to the public, the corporate form allows the SOEs to tap
into the billions of yuan held by Chinese investors, alleviating the strain
on capital that China faces.142 Moreover, supplying shares to the public
141. China officially has two stock exchanges and an over the counter trading system.
The system suffers from a host of problems that could hamper its ability to provide financing
for companies that trade their shares. One is the lack of sophistication among Chinese
investors, many of whom believe that the stocks present a risk free investment because " 'the
authorities would never let a company fail.' " Sun, Stock Market Fever, supra note 39, at Cl.
This may be true for now. Despite repeated assertions that ailing SOEs will be forced into
bankruptcy, of the one-third to one-half of SOEs losing money, few have gone bankrupt. See
supra note 87. Indeed, the government has proved willing to bail out the stock markets
before. See Andrew Brown, Beijing Bows to Public Anger, Rescues Markets, Reuter
Asia-Pacific Bus. Rep., Aug. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuapb File
(reporting that because the government feared another round of riots like the ones in 1992
opted to shore up the falling prices on the stock market that had wiped out the savings of
many ordinary Chinese). As reality sets in, however, the stock markets may present a bumpy
ride to unwary Chinese, causing them to lose interest, at least until the more questionable
enterprises are weeded out. See Philip Shenon, A Nail-Biting Ride in Shanghai, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1994, § 1, at 33 (reporting that many ordinary investors were planning to recover
their losses from the August 1994 slump and then take their money out of the stock markets
for good).
Exacerbating this has been the chronically weak disclosure rules on both exchanges.
Many foreigners and domestic investors are, for this reason, pulling out. Fairlamb, supra note
40, at 34; see also Brett Fromson, Veteran Investor Casts Global Net: Marc Faber Cautious
on Emerging Markets, WASH. POST, July 11, 1993, at HI, H1O (reporting that many in the
government choose to keep their money outside of China). Some companies have opted to list
overseas (where disclosure laws are harsher) to instill investor confidence. Julia Sze, The
Allure of B Shares: China Opens Securities Markets for Increased Foreign Investment, CHINA
Bus. REV., Jan. 1993, at 42.
Still, these problems can be solved with the "soon to be enacted" securities law. But see
Andrew Browne, Arguments Hold Up China Securities Law, Reuter Asia-Pacific Bus. Rep.,
Nov. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuapb File (reporting that opposition has
upheld the passage of the securities law for two years).
142. Moreover, it can do so through a preferable means of financing - equity. Philbrick,
supra note 37, at 575-77. For example, issuing shares in a company in exchange for invest-
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helps to soak up the enormous amount of investment demand in Chi-
na."'43 There is also evidence that "mixed companies" perform better than
public companies and so will be able to compete better with the private
sector.' 44 At the same.time, since the government retains ownership of
the assets, augmented by its majority shareholdership in the corporation,
the banner of socialism is kept intact.
2. Defining the Relationship
The "modern enterprise system" also goes some distance towards
defining the respective rights of the SOEs and the state to state assets.
The biggest problem is that the state retains ownership rights over the
state-owned assets and will establish specialized agencies to "supervise"
the assets. Precisely what the "supervision" entails is as yet unclear
because the government is still in the process of drafting the relevant
legislation.
45
Other rights are more clearly delineated, however. For example, the
Regulations on the Supervision of State-Owned Property of Industrial
Enterprises clearly explain how state-owned assets may be sold: only the
state may sell the state-owned assets, the state may not sell them to
private operators, and the SOE must use the money to pay bank debts
and "redundancies" and then to restructure other unprofitable SOEs.'
46
The Company Law also clearly defines the right to benefit. The law
requires that the company allocate ten percent of its after tax profit to an
official accumulation fund and five to ten percent to an official public
welfare fund. 47 If the company's official accumulation fund is insuffi-
cient to make up for losses sustained during the previous year, the
current year's profit must first be used to make up those losses before
ment capital entails no obligation to make payouts, as with bonds; enterprises can choose to
pay dividends only when there is a profit. Id.
143. Interestingly, Philbrick suggests that of the two components of a securities market
- the supply of and demand for shares - the demand side may be harder to develop. See id.
at 590-94. This is definitely not the case in China. See supra part I.A.2.
144. See Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in
Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and
State-Owned Enterprises, 32 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1989). Unfortunately, the same study finds that
private enterprises perform best of all.
145. China to Establish New State-Owned Assets Management System, supra note 140.
146. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 4; Chan, Guidelines Set, supra note 127, at 8
(discussing the Regulations on the Supervision of State-Owned Property of Industrial Enter-
prises). This solves the bankruptcy problem, at least to the extent that the ambiguous property
relationship kept SOEs from filing for bankruptcy.
147. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 177. Where the aggregate amount of the official
accumulation fund has already reached in excess of 50% of the company's registered capital,
further allocations are not required. Id.
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the current year's allocations to the two funds. 4 Profits may then be
allocated to a discretionary accumulation fund with approval from the
shareholders, which is essentially retained earnings, or distributed to the
shareholders. 149 Thus, this system certainly seems "to parcel out some
(or most) of the constituent rights of ownership into a bundle of rights
which are clearly defined and legally protected."'' °
3. Effecting the Cultural Transformation
As has been demonstrated, however, to reform the SOEs,
corporatization must do more than paper over the symptoms and define
the property relationship; it must change the culture of state intervention
that the ambiguous relationship has fostered.' 5 ' Some have argued that
taking the corporate form makes it harder for either the state or the
SOEs to behave as they do under the current system. Even though the
government owns assets, the argument goes, the residual riskholders (the
shareholders) are now able to escape their risk by selling their shares.
The majority owner (the state) thus has an incentive to appoint manag-
ers who will maximize profits and otherwise behave efficiently.
52
The modern enterprise system has not been implemented in a way
that should ease one's mind about state intervention, however. The
Company Law contains provisions that continue to allow state interven-
tion in unpredictable ways, hindering the crucial formation of expecta-
tions. First, majority shareholders in China have enormous power, more
so than their counterparts in a typical western corporation. 53 This power
148. Id
149. Id art 7.
150. Wang, supra note 4, at 134.
151. The outlook is not necessarily bright. Despite repeated assertions that the modern
enterprise system clarifies the state-enterprise property relationship, the Vice-Minister of the
State Commission for Restructuring the Economy stated in a recent interview that the 1994
Regulations "would assure managers of enterprises their rights in managing their firms and
avoid the sensitive issues of the ownership of companies." Daniel Kwan, Way Clear to Close
Ailing State Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at 8 (emphasis added).
152. Boycko, supra note 47, at 143; see also Economist Views State Firms Under
Modern Enterprise System, Xinhua, Mar. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Xinhua File ("[M]ajor state enterprises will have multiple principal holders of their property
rights, instead of just one principal holder, that is, the state.").
153. The shareholders have the usual powers of shareholders in western corporations,
like electing and dismissing members of the Board of Directors, setting salaries for the Board,
considering their reports, inspecting financial records, and deciding on issuance of additional
shares and on such fundamental changes as mergers, dissolution, and liquidation. Art & Gu,
supra note 11. They also have powers far beyond what the western shareholder has: to decide
the policy of management and the plan of investment of the company, approve the budget,
decide on issuance of bonds, consider and approve the plan of distribution of profits and
recovery of losses, and decide on issuance of dividends. Id. The responsibilities of the board
of directors are typical of western corporations and include selecting managers and making
key business decisions. Id.; see also Company Law, supra note 12, art. 46.
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is significant because in corporatized SOEs it is the state that will be
wielding the shareholders' rights.
Another avenue of state intervention might be the concept of the
"legal representative," a natural person authorized to act on behalf of a
legal person, in this case, the corporation. This legal representative is
personally responsible for the failures of the legal person and could be
subjected to administrative penalties, fines, and imprisonment for offens-
es like "engaging in business beyond the company's authorized
scope." '154 Finally, another opening for state intervention is the as yet
undefined state asset management agencies, discussed above.
Conversely, there may be nothing to counterbalance the state's
power. The ability of the shareholders to escape risk by selling shares is
questionable given the immaturity of the stock markets, 155 so the pres-
sure on the state, and subsequently on the managers, to behave efficient-
ly is reduced. Additionally, the Company Law does not do anything to
force the supervisory units to bear the risk of their decisions. In short,
the modem enterprise system has left an enormous amount of room for
the state to continue to intervene in the affairs of the SOEs after
corporatization. It is thus hard to conclude that the clarification of the
property relationship that has occurred on paper will result in real
changes in the way the state or the SOEs behave.
CONCLUSION,
The problems arising from the SOEs' poor performance have con-
vinced China's leadership that its SOEs are in need of restructuring.
Despite anomalies like the TVE, the cause of these problems appears to
be the ambiguous state-enterprise property relationship, which has
created a culture of state intervention. Attempts to solve the problem to
date, however, have failed. The first couple of attempts failed because
they did not define the relationship clearly enough; the last attempt
failed even though the property relationship appeared to have been
spelled out quite clearly on paper. An examination of the phenomenon
of privatization suggested that the problem lay in the fact that the at-
tempts to solve the problem to date had not effected a crucial cultural
transformation in conceptions of ownership rights.
Although corporatization creates an organizational structure that
would seem to make it difficult for the state to intervene, the special
characteristics of the Company Law and the rest of the "modem enter-
154. Art & Gu, supra note 11.
155. See supra note 141.
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prise system" make it virtually impossible for the corporatized SOE to
realize this potential because the state and the SOE remain intertwined.
Thus, although corporatizing SOEs may be a step in the right direction,
corporatization must not be the last step in the process of restructuring
SOEs.
This Note does not suggest that corporatization is useless; indeed,
corporatization will alleviate many of the stresses that China's economy
faces. However, this Note cautions that this success does not mean that
SOE reform is complete. If the Company Law does not succeed in
bringing about the cultural transformation in attitudes towards state
intervention, SOEs will continue to exhibit many of the inefficient
behaviors and to cause many of the problems described in this Note. As
China implements the Company Law, then, the task for reformers is to
understand the importance of the cultural transformation in order to
make a realistic evaluation of the successes and failures of corpor-
atization and to plan for the future evolution of SOEs.
